The Great Recession of 2008 
Law and economics has developed into a school of contemporary legal rhetoric with a particular, effective combination of topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style that are relevant to legal rhetoric beyond the economic analysis of law. My Article is the first to examine the prescriptive implications of the rhetoric of law and economics for general legal discourse as opposed to examining the benefits and limitations of the economic analysis of law itself. This Article advances the conversation in two areas: first, as to the study and understanding of the persuasiveness of law and economics, particularly because that persuasiveness has played a role in influencing American economic and financial policy leading up to the Great Recession; and second, as to the study and understanding of the use of economic topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in general legal discourse when evaluated in comparison to the other schools of classical and contemporary legal rhetoric. My conclusion is that the rhetorical

INTRODUCTION
Why has law and economics been so persuasive leading up to the Great Recession 1 ?
This article examines law and economics as a school of contemporary legal rhetoric with a particular combination of rhetorical modes of communication and persuasion-the rhetorical canons of law and economics-that have made it persuasive to many audiences within and without the legal community. My goal is to critique the rhetoric of the neoclassical and contemporary law and economics 2 analysis of law, not to examine the benefits or costs of the application of one form of economic analysis or 1 I take the name, "Great Recession," from none other than Nobel Laureate Professor Joseph Stiglitz, who recently discounted decades of neoclassical economic assumptions when he pointed out that "markets do not work well on their own" and that in the recent recession, the United States suffered because the economy lost its "balance between the role of markets and the role of government." JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY xii (2010) . 2 I use the term "contemporary law and economics" to mean twenty-first century law and economics that incorporates behavioral and socio-economic approaches to the study and analysis of law. Contemporary law and economics has evolved from "new" or "neoclassical" law and economics that developed in the 1960s and which applied neoclassical economic principles and methodologies to the analysis of law. New or neoclassical law and economics is also referred to as "traditional" or "conventional" law and economics. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW]; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071 , 2088 (1996 
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Rhetoric and law and economics do not often share the same paragraph in academic legal writing let alone the same article title, 5 but a central focus of the discipline of law and economics is the study of human nature and human behavior 6 in order to predict what incentives can be communicated to humans that will motivate them to act or react, and thus law and economics shares a common goal of rhetoric, the study of communication and persuasion. The advocates of the economic analysis of law must persuade their own cohorts of the truth of their discoveries, and use the rhetoric of their discipline to do so, and also seek to communicate the lessons of their economic analysis of law to the wider legal community, and again use the rhetoric of their discipline to persuade the wider audience. That law and economics is persuasive beyond the confirmed members of the discipline is supported by modern history: critics and supporters alike agree that law and economics has established itself as the dominant and most influential contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars. The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is persuasive-and not just to legal economists-reveals the enormous potential of law and economics as a lens on legal discourse through which to examine the structure and design of the discourse and as a source of topoi (topics) of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in the content of the discourse. It also helps to explain why so many persons in the academy, the legal profession, the courts, and government could be persuaded to alter the economy and financial system of the United States in accordance with the prescriptions of law and economics in ways that helped to bring about the Great Recession.
The topoi and tropes of law and economics inspire inventive thinking about the law that constructs meaning for the author and the audience. For many members of the legal writing discourse community-judges, practitioners, government agencies, and academics-the modes of persuasion of law and economics can provide a critical perspective to construct meaning and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse generally in content, arrangement, and style. 
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through which to examine and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse.
Law and economics is a discipline that brings a unique combination of modes of persuasion used both as rhetorical topoi 12 and tropes 13 to construct meaning and to inform and persuade its audiences: the priority of mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and demonstration, the characterization of legal phenomena as incentives and costs, the rhetorical economic concept of efficiency, and the lessons of rational choice theory as Growth and Development, 1 LEGAL WRITING 1 (1991). 12 In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus = "place") are the "topics" or "subjects" of argument that can be made in various situations. Topoi are developed in the process of inventio [Latin] or heuresis [Greek] , which may be translated as "invention" or "discovery" of the type of argument that will be most persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio [Latin] or taxis [Greek] of the argument, which translates as the "arrangement" or "organization" or "disposition" of the contents of the argument. See EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 17, 20, 89-91 (4th ed. 1999 
Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of
Great Recession and Rhetorical Canons of Law & Economics 9
corrected by the empirical studies of behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science.
My examination of contemporary law and economics as a rhetorical perspective requires the discussion of the following theses:
• Law and economics is inherently rhetorical and uses its own rhetoric to persuade the members of the law and economics discourse community as well as the legal community as a whole.
• Law and economics uses a unique combination of modes of persuasion as rhetorical topoi and tropes-the rhetorical canons of law and economics-which are:
o Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and demonstration;
o The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives and costs, o The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and o Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science.
The rhetorical canons of law and economics alone did not cause the Great Recession. Canons of rhetoric are tools for legal discourse, not universal goals and not perfect solutions. Law and economics provides a rhetorical lens through which a legal author might examine and improve the persuasiveness of her discourse regarding the economy, governmental regulation, or any other topic of the law. But a lens, like any other tool, is only as good as its user. My conclusion is that the rhetorical canons of law and economics can be used to create meaning and inspire imagination in legal discourse beyond the economic analysis of law, but the choice to employ the canons must be made with regard to the rhetorical concept of ethos and the needs, demands, and limitations of the rhetorical situation at hand.
I. THE RHETORICAL NATURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
A. Law and Economics is Inherently Rhetorical
Law and economics, like all disciplines of academic inquiry and study, uses rhetoric to explain and justify its assumptions, models, paradigms, assertions, and predictions. 14 To understand the assertion represented by the sub-heading of this section-law and economics is inherently rhetorical-one must understand the nature of rhetoric: Rhetoric is the "discovery and transmission of insight and knowledge."
15
Rhetoric is the discipline that examines "ways of winning others over to our views, and of justifying those views to ourselves as well as others, when the question of how things in the world ought to work is contested or contestable." [W]e are now invited to think hard about the rhetoric of everything; "the rhetoric of philosophy," "the rhetoric of sociology," "the rhetoric of religion," even "the rhetoric of science." Though these rhetorics are not all of the same kind, we should realize that all of these fields depend on rhetoric in their arguments. Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others in a particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to somebody, and speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes place with given materials. Id.
16
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 7. See also White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 13, at 684 (rhetoric establishes, maintains, and transforms the community and the culture); James Boyd White, A Symposium: The Theology of "Classical rhetoric" was begun in the fifth century B.C.E. and continued on and perfected over the course of the next 1,000 years of Greco-Roman history by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 15-16, 18-19. Even after this reign as the defining study of public discourse in classical times, the scholarship and teachings of classical rhetoric were followed as the dominant discipline for developing legal arguments until the first quarter of the nineteenth century. See id. at 2, 15. The origin of classical rhetoric as a discipline devoted to the study of legal discourse and argumentation is traced to Corax of Syracuse. See, e.g., Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 615 (1999) [hereinafter Frost, Lost Heritage] . The early tenets of the discipline were critiqued by Socrates and by Socrates' student, Plato, see infra note 19, and subsequently they were refined by Plato's student, Aristotle. See JOHN H. MACKIN, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR MODERN DISCOURSE vii, 6-7, 17-18, 26 (1969) & RHETORIC 6-8, 389-92 (1968) [hereinafter Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation] (the impact of situation). Over time, the cognitive rhetoric group divided into the process theory cognitivists, who believe that the study of rhetoric should focus on the process of writing, a recursive rather than linear creative process, that teaches the writer how to reason and persuade and improve their communication by examining each stage of the writing process, see ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS, supra note 16, at 79, and the discourse community cognitivists, who believe the study of rhetoric is a study of the writer's assimilation into and acceptance of the tenets, vocabulary, and expectations of a discourse community, such as the legal writing discourse community. See, e.g., id. The socio-epistemic group combines social theories of community with epistemological theories of learning to form a theory of communication that considers the interaction of speaker, subject matter, and audience. See id. at 81.
The common thread among these the schools of thought in the developing discipline of contemporary rhetoric was a shift in thinking on the nature of study of persuasion and argument has a noble and classical tradition, but the discipline has had difficulty shaking off a common but enduring slur that is traced to ancient sources: Socrates and Plato described the early study and practice of rhetoric by the ancient Greek Sophists as the art of flattery and trickery, 21 and throughout the ages the slur has stuck. I emphasize that this slur is not the subject of my study here. Rhetoric, the academic discipline, is not the study of hollow speech, not puffery designed to prop up specious assertions, not hyperbole employed to distract an audience from the truths or falsities of the speakers' In short, it is nothing like the meaning of the commonplace phrase, "mere rhetoric." 23 I am not examining law and economics as a scheme of flattery and trickery but rather as a discipline with a well-developed system of argumentation and persuasion that has lessons for legal discourse beyond the realm of economic analysis of law.
B. Excerpts from the History of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics
The discipline of economics is rhetorical, 24 and the discipline of law and economics is rhetorical, too.
25
Adam Smith, the honorary father of economics, apparently understood the rhetorical imperatives of economics and the law when, in his Lectures on Jurisprudence concerning principle in the human mind and the division of labor, he commented on the topic of exchanges and self-interest:
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an 22 See, e.g., KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL, THE RHETORICAL ACT 3-4 (1982); Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetorical Stance, in Toward a New Rhetoric, 14 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 139, 139 (1963) For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and master of economics. . . . We learn that for everything we have to give up something else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when we elect.
29
Judge Richard Posner summarizes the foundational rhetoric of law and economics as follows:
[T]he most interesting aspect of the law and economics movement has been its aspiration to place the study of law on a scientific basis, with coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of the hypotheses. Law is . . . amenable to scientific study. Economics is the most advanced of the social sciences, and 
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the legal system contains many parallels to and overlaps with the systems that economists have studied successfully.
30
[The economic] approach enables the law to be seen, grasped, and studied as a system-a system that economic analysis can illuminate, reveal as coherent, and in places improve. By the same token, the approach enables economics to be seen as a tool for understanding and reforming social practices, rather than merely as a formal system of daunting mathematical complexity.
31
C. The Nature of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics
Law and economics is a discipline whose persuasion is built from the application of scientific analyses-especially mathematics and the quantitative analysis of empirical data-to social problems.
32
Law is a discipline that attempts to deal with social problems, and legal issues and the social conditions created or imposed or perpetuated by the state of the law are problems or conditions that may be subjected to economic analyses "with coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of the hypotheses."
33
Economics provides scientific theories to predict the effects of legal rules on behavior that surpasses mere intuition, logic, or common sense concerning human behavior.
34
The theories are behavioral theories that seek to predict how people will respond to laws when laws are viewed as a system of incentives.
35
Legal economists assert that economics is a persuasive rhetorical lens on the law because it has mathematically precise theories (price theory and game theory) and empirically sound methods (statistics and econometrics) of analyzing the effects of legal rules and sanctions (viewed as incentives, prices, or costs) on (presumptively rational) human behavior to achieve desirable (efficient) results for individuals and for society.
36
II. THE RHETORICAL CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
A. The Four Canons
If law and economics is inherently rhetorical, then what is the rhetorical nature of this discipline when used as a rhetorical lens in the law? I start with my summary of the rhetoric of the discipline introduced earlier: Economics combines mathematically precise theories and empirically sound methods of analyzing the effects of incentives and costs on presumptively rational human behavior to achieve efficient results for individuals and for society. The contemporary rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science 41 Each of four canons of law and economics are used both as topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in persuasive discourse. The canons represent the fundamental assumptions upon and from which propositions regarding law and economics will be measured as persuasive in both conception and design and according to which theses concerning law and economics will be accepted as reliable and authoritative by the members of the law and economics discipline 
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by the members of the law and economics discourse community. 43 Therefore, these canons are described as rhetorical canons of law and economics.
B. The Interaction of the Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics
Canons of rhetoric are customarily expressed or depicted in a manner that reflects the interaction of the canons in a persuasive exercise; all of the canons work together and simultaneously to affect the persuasiveness of the discourse of the discipline or activity. Each canon also simultaneously affects the operation of the other canons, making them more or less persuasive. In classical rhetoric, the three canons of invention (aspects of persuasion that must be devised or "invented" by the author or speaker) known as logos, ethos, and pathos, 44 are often depicted as a rhetorical triangle to suggest the interaction of the factors one to another and the combined impact on the recipient of the discourse:
Behavioral Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007) ; and the sources cited in subsections 1-4 of this section.
43
"Discourse community" is a term that grounds this discussion as to the rhetoric of law and economics. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 419-38 (1995 
20
Author • Ethos
With regard to the classical modes of invention, Jakob Wisse presents the concept as a linear flow James Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder Decoder, linking the author, the language or message, and the reader or audience to reality. with or, in optimal circumstance, as part of the logos of the message so as to influence the pathos of the audience. Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder -Signal Decoder, linking the author, the language or message, and the reader or audience to reality.
46
The author projects his ethos along with or, in optimal circumstance, as part of the logos of the o as to influence the pathos of the audience.
47
The rhetorical pathways are fundamentally pragmatic. Aristotle sought to remind advocates that an argument is not one dimensional. The most logically constructed argument still will 
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not persuade an audience if the audience questions the knowledge, skill, or credibility of the author. Similarly, the most respected author whose reputation is beyond question still will not win the day if her argument is riddled with logical fallacies and comes apart at the seams with a single, gentle tug at one of its logical flaws. An ironclad argument may be delivered in such a way as to antagonize the audience, or the effect of the argument may be squandered if the audience begins to question the integrity and credibility of the author.
49
The four canons of law and economics rhetoric interact together at the same time and toward the same audience. Proper economic discourse incorporates each canon for the persuasion of the audience. There is a connection and interaction in the discourse of each canon to the others that influences the persuasion of the audience-one cannot alter or abandon the canons of efficiency, mathematical and scientific certainty, response to incentives, and even rational choice without affecting the persuasiveness and effectiveness of the economic discourse. An incorrect, overstated, or deceptive message regarding one canon puts the others at risk of suspicion or rejection by the audience. As with classical rhetorical modes of invention, the interaction of the canons of law and economics may be depicted visually, although with four canons it shall be a rhetorical diamond, not a triangle: 
DISCOURSE DIAMOND of the RHETORICAL CANONS of
In modern argument theory, the author of the discourse (Speaker) codes the discourse ( (Audience) according to the conditions, requirements, and limitations of the context of the discourse ( economics rhetorical discourse, the closely aligned with the canon of achieve an efficient purpose is coded in the language of and Costs and is framed for the needs of the Audience according to the Rational Choice Theory reference to the rhetorical Situation with a distinct pr the methods of Mathematics and Science. Therefore, t diamond of the canons of law and economics is aligned to the flow of the discourse wherein each canon feeds into and simultaneously draws from the other canons components of modern argument theory. 
DISCOURSE DIAMOND of the RHETORICAL CANONS of LAW AND ECONOMICS
In modern argument theory, the author of the discourse ) codes the discourse (Message) for a particular receiver ) according to the conditions, requirements, and limitations of the context of the discourse (Situation). In law and economics rhetorical discourse, the Speaker's purpose is most closely aligned with the canon of Efficiency, the Message achieve an efficient purpose is coded in the language of Incentives and is framed for the needs of the Audience according to the Rational Choice Theory, and the means used are chosen in reference to the rhetorical Situation with a distinct preference for the methods of Mathematics and Science. Therefore, the rhetorical diamond of the canons of law and economics is aligned to depict the flow of the discourse wherein each canon feeds into and simultaneously draws from the other canons in alignment with the components of modern argument theory. 
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The Primacy of Mathematical and Scientific Methods of Analysis and Demonstration
The practitioners of law and economics-those who follow the conventional and the contemporary approaches-rely on the inherent persuasiveness of mathematics and the methodologies of scientific proof both as a method of analysis and as a form for the demonstration 50 of the analysis.
51
Members of the economic disciplines hold themselves out as scientists, applying logical, scientific deduction and induction to prove propositions. 'Y 443, 445, 451-52, 455-56 (2010) .
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in science, mathematics, and rhetorical demonstration.
53
Contemporary law and economics assumes and advocates the rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical methods of analysis in forming hypotheses, designing the methods for testing the hypotheses, and analyzing the data, statistics, and information collected to test the hypotheses.
54
Law and economics also assumes the rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical forms in discourse to demonstrate the analyses and communicate its theses about human behavior.
55
In contemporary law and economics, predictions and prescriptions are informed by scientific testing and mathematical analysis of data not just by logic, intuition, common sense, ideology, or philosophy.
56
The methods of examination and the assumptions made that are supported by the rhetoric of 53 The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal argument is the enthymeme. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at Bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a. The deductive structure of the syllogism and enthymeme provides the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of legal discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and TREAT. LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th ed. 2010 
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contemporary law and economics and law and behavioral science are those that are susceptible to scientific proof through the application of mathematical and scientific methods of analysis of empirical data to confirm or rebut hypotheses and assumptions about human behavior in the context of the law.
57
But the propositions chosen to be proved, and especially the design of the experiments or studies that will be adequate and reliable to prove the propositions, rely on rhetoric-the rhetoric being that which is held within the disciplines to be reasonable, reliable, and provable using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology.
58
Mathematics is a language, and like any other language, is rhetorical.
59
Mathematics is a wonderful tool of analysis, but the elevation of mathematical forms and models as the primary method of demonstration in economic rhetoric comes with a warning for the application of this trope in general legal discourse: it is not realistic to assume that every legal issue and social 57 See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON, LOUIS KAPLOW ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 372, 375-77 (2003 REV. 51, 54, 61-63, 121-124 (1996) 
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condition can be subjected to mathematical analysis. 60 Albert Einstein once said, "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."
61
The very word, proof, as in what the economist or behavioral scientist has proved, is inherently rhetorical in nature, 62 and it is a powerfully persuasive word. An assertion that something is proved or even can be proved is a rhetorical assertion because, even in mathematics, there are some assertions and propositions that cannot be proved within a known mathematical system.
63
The differences in opinions as to what are reasonable, reliable, and provable assumptions and predictions in economics using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology have led to internal divisions within the law and economics community, and led directly to the creation of the law and behavioral science discipline, as discussed in Part II.A.4 below.
The rhetorical use of mathematical forms in law and economics-the use of mathematics as a trope of arrangement and style in the demonstration-is to this author the most intriguing aspect of this canon, and the most delicate topic from which to draw prescriptions for legal discourse. 
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attractive tool, but is it too seductive? Critics have challenged legal economists for adopting complex mathematical formulae to demonstrate findings the relevance of which to actual legal problems and social conditions is said to be specious. 64 Nevertheless, the a priori, ex ante, positivist application of mathematical formulas to legal topics and problems has led the practitioners of neoclassical law and economics to claim their greatest successes. 65 Unfortunately, this has come at a cost, namely a string of mathematically verifiable prescriptions that brought about policies that contributed to the severity of the Great Recession.
I explained above that my purpose here is not to critique the benefits or costs of the use of the canons of law and economics in the economic analysis of law. My purpose is to explore the application of these rhetorical canons in legal discourse generally. On the one hand, mathematics is a language, and thus rhetorical, and its particular form of persuasion is an appeal to certainty by the open demonstration of the truth and logic of its workings.
66
On the other hand, mathematical forms of demonstration may be employed to attempt to overcome "the difference between truth in mathematics and truth in law-between logical truths and 64 E.g., MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS, supra note 22, at 44-45; Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 24, at 38; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 485-90 (1987) . 65 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at xix (championing the unity, simplicity, and power, but also the subtlety, of economic principles); James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 275, 287-88 (1997) ; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 5 (1994) ("Assumptions about preference have enabled neoclassical economics and public choice theory to describe both private and public markets by means of mathematical models that have great elegance and rhetorical power."); Richard Posner Rhetoric, 93 ETHICS 45, 46-47 (1982) ; and CHAIM PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 120-74 (1980) ; CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES 1-61, 117-33 (1979) ). The difference between formal logic and the absolute proof of the syllogism, and informal logic used in everyday discourse to assert the most probable arguments in everyday situations, is one of the primary impetuses that motivated the move to contemporary schools of rhetoric building on the work of Burke and Perelman. See also BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, supra note 18; BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES, supra note 18; PERELMAN, REALM OF RHETORIC, supra note 18; PERELMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 18. Pigou, one of the forefathers of neoclassical law and economics, pointed out the distinction between formal logic and pure mathematics on the one side and the "realistic sciences" on the other, as to which economics was to be a realistic science. A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 5 (4th ed. 1962) ("On the one side are the sciences of formal logic and pure mathematics, whose function it is to discover implications. On the other side are the realistic sciences, such as physics, chemistry and biology, which are concerned with actualities."). absolute than they really are. It seems highly likely that government policy was shifted because of the seeming certainly of the formulas that supported law and economics' prescriptions regarding unregulated markets and government non-interference in financial systems. This possibility sends a significant message of caution for the ethos-minded use of mathematical and scientific forms in general legal discourse.
The Characterization of Law and the Legal System in the Language of Incentives and Costs
The rhetoric of traditional and contemporary law and economics begins with a seminal insight of economics: that people respond to incentives 70 and that the law (legal rules and the legal system) can create incentives that can influence human behavior in one direction and can create disincentives that can influence human behavior in the other direction.
71
Legal rules and the legal system can "encourage socially desirable conduct and discourage undesirable conduct" by rewarding or subsidizing certain behavior and punishing or taxing other behavior. REV. 133, 164-65 (1996) ; Lior system can increase the costs of certain behavior or lesson the costs of other behavior.
73
The premise that people respond to incentives is rhetorical; 74 it is both an assumption and a presumption that shapes the predictions that analysts using the methodology of law and economics can make about the effects of law and the recommendations that these analysts are willing to make about changes to the law.
75
Law and economics imported this assumption from economics, along with the assumption that people react rationally to incentives.
76
Economists' examination of human behavior within various legal and social environments of the world involves the characterization of many phenomena as either incentives or costs. This chart (a taxonomy, an economic-friendly demonstration of data-a topos of arrangement or trope of style) indicates that the language (i.e., the rhetoric) of costs and incentives is fairly common in legal analysis among courts and in legal scholarship. Legal authors-judges, scholars, and practitioners-already are employing incentives and costs language in substantive legal discourse with significant frequency. Every time an author writes about a cost-benefit analysis, every time a change in the law is said to "incentivize" certain conduct, every time a license or permit application process is said to provide a disincentive to an activity, every time a change in procedural rules is said to impose an "externality" on the cost of litigation, the author uses a rhetorical trope of style (a figure of speech) to discuss laws and legal conditions as incentives or costs in contexts that are not necessarily business or contract settings or do not involve the calculation of pecuniary sums or damages. 89 The basic statement that humans respond favorably to incentives and not favorably to costs disguises the rhetorical complexity of this presumption when it comes to making predictions about human behavior in legal situations and in response to legal conditions. First, incentives or costs must be designed, communicated, and recognized by the human actor or institution; government must correctly design and communicate its actions so as to offer the benefit or impose the tax that government intends to offer to or impose on its audience of citizens, and private actors must correctly design and communicate their actions so as to offer the correct intended inducement or impose the intended price or rent. 90 Second, and equally important to the rhetoric of the discipline, is the fact that the action must be perceived and understood by the human audience, the object or recipient of government's or a private actor's action, and what should be perceived and understood as an incentive as opposed to a cost is not always a simple process for humans.
91
The rhetorical canon of incentives and cost is closely associated with the canon of rational choice: the design, communication, perception, and motivation concerning incentives and costs require analysis and an understanding of the rhetorical audience and the rhetorical situation. 92 Scientific empirical analysis 89 of human behavior indicates that there are limitations on humans' abilities to understand and appreciate benefits and costs. 93 These limitations are assumed and represented in the rhetorical statement that humans are creatures of "bounded" abilities-bounded rationality, bounded ability to gather information, bounded perception, and bounded cognition. These bounds limit humans' abilities to perceive and understand the incentives and costs set before them, which in turn complicates the predictions and prescriptions of economists regarding the motivational effect of incentives and costs. This is the rhetorical "audience" consideration with incentives and costs.
Separately, there is the mounting scientific empirical evidence of the social, cognitive, and brain sciences that indicates that humans are situational decision-makers.
94
A consideration of the rhetorical problems of audience and situation are commonplace in rhetoric, and contemporary rhetoric in particular has covered this ground well. E.g., White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 13, at 695: Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others in a particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to somebody, and speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes place with given materials.
In substantive terms, law and economics assumes and advocates efficiency over more abstract concepts of fairness, morality, and justice.
98
This is not to say that fairness, morality, and justice are never incorporated into an economic analysis, but that economists find it preferable to assume such concepts into the rhetorical economic concepts of efficiency-in other words, assuming for purposes of a model or prescription that a fair, moral, and just solution will be more efficient according to one of the economic conceptions of efficiency. 99 Efficiency (or parsimony) in the rhetoric of law and economics is not just a formal imperative for methods and procedures of modeling paradigms and the formulation of hypotheses and theses, but it also has been advanced as a substantive and instrumental imperative in positive examination of conditions, normative analysis of possible conditions, and prescriptions for future conditions. 100 Efficiency, 98 the presumption of rationality in the face of various legal conditions.
115
The behavioral approach asserts that the definition of rationality and its weight in making predictions about human behavior in the face of legal conditions must be modified with the knowledge and understanding gained from behavioral science, which gives a clearer picture of the nature and limits of human rationality in response to legal situations.
The acceptance or at least the acknowledgement that rational choice is more bounded than traditional rational choice theories and models have predicted presents a problem for the rhetoric of the discipline and complexity in the use of rational choice theory as a rhetorical lens for legal discourse. The rhetoric of the discipline can redefine its theories and definitions of "rational" so as to incorporate the empirical observations of seemingly nontraditional, irrational behavior in legal situations requiring a choice.
116
For example, in response to the ultimatum game studies,
117
"rational" as a definition may be modified from a strict 115 There is considerable debate within both the economics and law-andeconomics communities about precisely what rational choice theory is and is not. As it is applied implicitly or explicitly in the law-andeconomics literature, however, it is understood alternatively as a relatively weak, or thin, presumption that individuals act to maximize their expected utility, however they define this, or as a relatively strong, or thick, presumption that individuals act to maximize their selfinterest. Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1055 (inner citations omitted). 116 In fact, it is only rational for law and economics scholars to attempt to preserve the theory of rational choice by expanding the definition of "rational" as this will avoid throwing out the entire canon of rational choice as an operative foundation for economic models, theories, and predictions. 117 Ultimatum game studies test the theory that when a person is assigned a sum and asked to offer a portion of the sum to another person with the understanding that if the other person accepts the offer, both will take away something-the offeror keeps the remainder of the sum not offered, and the offeree keeps what was offered and accepted-but neither person will take away anything if the offer is not accepted. Traditional rational choice theory predicted that a tiny sum would be offered because this maximizes the offeror's pecuniary self-interest, while allowing the offeree to take away something, however small. The studies belied this prediction by observing that offerees routinely rejected
